Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1985

State of Utah v. Orlando F. Roybal : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David Wilkinson; Attorney General; Sandra L. Sjogren; Assistant Attorney General.
Lynn R. Brown; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Roybal, No. 20560.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1985).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/464

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH SUPREME COURT
UTAH

DOCUMENT
KLU
45.9

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

.SffTATE OF UTAH,

DOCKET NO. ..

flftfhV

.

PIai ntIff-Respondent,

Case No. 20560

-vORLANDO F. ROYBAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF A
DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED PERSON,
A SECOND-DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 6 - 1 0 - 5 0 3 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , IN THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, PRESIDING.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
A t t o r n e y General
SANDRA L. SJOGREN
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General
236 S t a t e C a p i t o l
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114

LYNN R. BROWN
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111

DOT ?. 1 1SR5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
f*-l—.Ar

C S i«.«.*•*»«»»ii

{':":>

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 20560

-vORLANDO F. ROYBAL,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF A
DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED PERSON,
A SECOND-DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 6 - 1 0 - 5 0 3 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , IN THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, PRESIDING.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
A t t o r n e y General
SANDRA L. SJOGREN
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General
236 S t a t e C a p i t o l
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114

LYNN R. BROWN
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pa
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

i

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

i

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE WARRANTLESS FRISK OF DEFENDANT WAS
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE AND THE
EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESULT OF THE
FRISK WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AT TRIAL . .

CONCLUSION

5
9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

{

TABXE DF ADTHDTIITTES
CASES CITED
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)

7

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)

6

State v. Carter, No. 19522, slip op.
(Utah filed Sept. 27, 1985)

7

State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985)

...

6

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

7

United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223
(5th Cir. 1984)

6

United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098
(5th Cir. 1976)

8

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. I 76-10-503 (1978)

-ii-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Was the warrantless frisk of defendant based on an

articulable reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and
dangerous or that he had committed or was committing a crime?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

Case No. 20560

ORLANDO F. ROYBAL,
Defendant-Appellant•
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second-degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1978).
Defendant was convicted of the charged crime, in
a non-jury trial held August 29, 1984, in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding.

Judge Wilkin-

son sentenced defendant on February 15, 1985, to an indeterminate prison term of 1 to 15 years and a $10,000 fine.
The Judge stayed execution of the prison term and the fine
and placed defendant on probation in the intensive supervision program for 18 months.

The court also imposed a

fine of $1,000 and a 90-day jail term which defendant
elected to serve by participating in 450 hours of community
service.

As a further condition of probation, defendant was

required to maintain full employment.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The brief detention of defendant for purposes of
a limited frisk for weapons was justified by the officer's
reasonable suspicion that defendant was carrying a concealed
weapon, which is a crime.

The facts as known to the officer,

viewed from an objective standard, supported the officer's
suspicion of defendant's criminal activity and the officer's
desire to protect himself from defendant's possible use of
a concealed weapon.

The trial court, therefore, properly

denied defendant's motion to suppress the pistol that the
officer discovered during the pat-down search.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 21, 1984 at approximately 9:00 a.m.,
Officers Mitchell and Baird of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office responded in separate patrol cars to a suspicious vehic
complaint (T. 66-67, 105-106).

The name of the complainant

given to them by dispatch was Orlando Roybal (T. 68, 106).
The address given was 3387 South 145 East (T. 67, 74).
The complainant said the vehicle was a green sedan carrying
three male Mexicans (T. 106).
Both officers had received information earlier that
morning from their car partners that Orlando Roybal, the
defendant, had been arrested at approximately 5:30 a.m. that
day (T. 68, 107). The car partners said defendant was arreste
at that time for a domestic disturbance at the same address
(T. 68, 113). Defendant's girlfriend had called in the police
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when defendant allegedly shot holes through a window of
their apartment with a firearm (T. 68-69, 113). The car
partners reported that the firearm was not recovered when
defendant was taken into custody (T. 68, 114).
Mitchell and Baird began talking over their car
radios immediately and exchanged the information their car
partners had related to them earlier (T. 108-110).

Mitchell

asked dispatch if defendant remained in jail at that time and
was told that he was in jail (T. 70, 107). Mitchell then
asked dispatch for the complainant's location and was given
the address of a telephone booth near the Grand Central store
on 3400 South and State Street, two blocks west of defendant's
apartment (T. 70-71, 106). Mitchell asked dispatch to call
the telephone number and to send a deputy to the telephone
booth (T. 73). When the deputy arrived at the booth, the
phone was ringing and there was no one there (T. 73).
Mitchell and Baird continued on to the apartment
complex arriving at the same time (T. 75). They saw no green
sedan and no one on foot in the area (T. 75, 115). They parked
their cars on opposite corners of the west side of the complex
and waited a few minutes (T. 75, 115). After a short time,
a male Mexican emerged from between two buildings, hesitated
for a moment, looked up and down the street, and walked across
the lawn toward Mitchellfs car (T. 76-77, 115, 117-118).
Mitchell stepped out of his marked patrol car but
stood behind the car door as the man, identified at trial as
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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defendant, approached the driver's side of Mitchell's car
(T. 76-77, 83-84)-

When he arrived at the driver's side of

Mitchell's car, defendant turned so that he was not facing
Mitchell but his side was toward Mitchell and leaned back
against the car in front of the open door as if he was
concealing his back from Mitchell (T. 78).
Mitchell had never seen defendant before that time
and did not know that he was Orlando Roybal (T. 82) nor did
Baird (T. 120) . Mitchell stated that he asked defendant when
he got out of jail but that he did not know why he asked him
that (T. 78, 103). He said defendant did not identify himself
but defendant testified that he did identify himself as Orlando
Roybal as he walked toward Mitchell (T. 85, 138).
As defendant leaned against Mitchell's car, Baird
approached them (T. 79, 119). Mitchell was concerned for his
safety because of the nature of the call and the nature of
the offense the previous night (T. 81). Mitchell, therefore,
began a pat-down search of defendant by grasping defendant's
arm with one hand and running his other hand around defendant's
belt line (T. 79). Rolled into defendant's underwear waistband
at the small of his back, Mitchell found a loaded pistol
(T. 100-101) .
Mitchell said at trial that defendant made no
movements that indicated he was armed (T. 81-84).

Rather,

Mitchell said the situation as a whole appeared suspicious
to him including the nature of the previous call, the fact
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that defendant was supposedly still in jail at the time the
suspicious vehicle complaint was made by a person using his
name, and the way defendant leaned against the car with his
side toward Mitchell which forced him to turn his head to
talk with Mitchell (T. 89-90, 100).
Defendant testified elaborately about the events
leading up to his arrest both on the previous call and the
call which resulted in the possession of a dangerous weapon
charge.

He insisted that he did nothing to cause the officers

to suspect that he was armed (T. 138-139) and claimed that he
borrowed the pistol on the morning of his arrest to protect
himself from a group of persons who were after him (T. 136,
155) .
Judge Wilkinson admitted the pistol which was seized
from defendant after considering defendant's motion to suppress
the evidence (T.38).

Thereafter, Judge Wilkinson found

defendant guilty of possessing a firearm while being a
restricted person (T. 178).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WARRANTLESS FRISK OF DEFENDANT
WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE
AND THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESULT
OF THE FRISK WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED
AT TRIAL.
There are three separate levels of police encounters
with the public.

They are:

(1) An officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as the citizen is not detained against
his will; (2) an officer may seize a
person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime;
however, the "detention must be temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop";
(3) an officer may arrest a suspect if
the officer has probable cause to believe
an offense has been committed or is being
committed. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 498-499 (1983) .
United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984).
The encounter between Officer Mitchell and defendant fit all
three levels of contact described in Merritt.

First, Mitchell

merely spoke with defendant without detaining him as defendant
voluntarily approached Mitchell.

Second, after defendant leaned

against the patrol car, Mitchell became suspicious of defendant's behavior and detained defendant by grasping his arm while
performing a limited weapons search.

Third, Mitchell arrested

defendant after discovering the pistol concealed in defendant's
waistband.
Defendant challenged only the second level of contact
in the trial court, and on this appeal, claiming that Mitchell
did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal
activity to justify the detention and frisk of defendant.
He does not challenge the arrest as lacking in probable cause.
To justify the detention of defendant, Mitchell must
have had "a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts,
that the individual [was] involved in criminal activity."
State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985); quoting
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).

The reasonableness

of the frisk of defendant for weapons must also be judged by
an objective standard; i.e., "would the facts available to
the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief1 that the
action taken was appropriate?"

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,

21-22 (1968); see also State v. Carter, No. 19522, slip op.
at 3 (Utah filed Sept. 27, 1985).
In this case, the facts that justify the detention
are the same facts that justify the search.

Officer Mitchell

knew the following: (1) defendant was arrested in the early
morning hours of the same day for a domestic disturbance
during which a firearm was discharged (T. 68, 113); (2) NO
firearm was recovered at that time (T. 68, 114); (3) the
caller making the suspicious vehicle complaint identified
himself as Orlando Roybal, defendant's name (T. 68, 106);
(4) dispatch said that defendant was in jail at the time
the officers were responding to the complaint; (5) the
location of the suspicious vehicle was defendant's address
(T. 68, 74, 113); but (6) the location of the caller making
the complaint was a telephone booth two blocks from defendant's home (T. 71, 106); (7) there was no one at the telephone booth when officers checked it (T. 73); (8) there was
no green sedan or persons on foot around the apartment complex
fitting the description of the suspicious vehicle or persons
(T. 75, 115); defendant approached Mitchell's patrol car
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

voluntarly after a brief hesitation and identified himself
as Orlando Roybal (T. 118, 138); when defendant reached the
driver's door of Mitchell's car, he stopped, turned sideways
to Mitchell, and leaned his back against the front of the
car as if to conceal his back from Mitchell and Baird who
was at that time approaching the scene (T. 77-78, 120).
On these facts, Mitchell had reason to suspect that defendant
was committing the crime of carrying a concealed weapon and
that he might be about to commit a crime by using that weapon
against Mitchell and Baird.

Because there was no suspicious

vehicle in the area and no other persons around, Mitchell was
justified in thinking that defendant's complaint was a ruse,
intended to create the opportunity for revenge against the
officers who had arrested him hours earlier for domestic
violence involving discharge of a firearm.

Because the

firearm was not recovered in the previous arrest, Mitchell
reasonably suspected that defendant still had access to it.
Although Mitchell testified that he was not afraid
of defendant, there is:
no legal requirement that a policeman
must feel "scared" by the threat of
danger. Evidence that the officer was
aware of sufficient specific facts as
would suggest he was in danger satisfies
the constitutional requirement . . . so
long as it is clear that he was aware
of specific facts which would warrant
a reasonable person to believe he was
in danger.
United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976).
On the facts known to Mitchell at the time, regardless of
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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whether they were in fact ultimately erroneous as defendant
claims, any reasonable person in the same position would
have believed he was in danger and, therefore, the detention
and frisk were justified.
CONCLUSION
The State requests this Court to uphold the trial
court's denial of the motion to suppress, to deny defendant's
request for a new trial, and to affirm defendant's conviction,
DATED this

day of October, 1985.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

SANDRA L. SJOGREN
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Lynn R.
Brown, attorney for appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association, 333 South Second East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
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day of October, 1985.
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